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Ronald Coase, professor of economics at 
the University of Chicago Law School and 
winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics, died 
on September 2, 2013, at the age of 102.   
The influence of Coase's work is difficult to 
exaggerate.  In academic economics, he is 
credited with founding institutional econom-
ics.  In law, he is credited with founding the 
most influential movement in the US legal 
academy, law and economics, and his article 
"The Problem of Social Cost" (1960) is far and 
away the most cited text in the academic lit-
erature.  More importantly still, because his 
work was so influential among policy makers trained in 
economics and/or law, Coase's work can be said to have 
shaped political economy itself over several decades. 
I want to suggest that Coase's texts were so influential 
because they worked in essentially poetic ways -- he was 
probably the most powerful mythmaker in political econ-
omy since Marx.  Despite his intentions, Coase's work 
presented a way of seeing the world that make great 
sense not only to professors of economics, but also to 
capitalists (and hence lobbyists and politicians), and to 
law professors, who should have known better.  But I am 
getting ahead of myself. 
In awarding the Prize, the Swedish Royal Academy of 
Sciences cited two articles: "The Nature of the Firm" 
(1937), which was ignored for many years, and the 
aforementioned "The Problem of Social Cost." 
The Nature of the Firm" begins with an observation: 
the business world is composed of any number of rela-
tions that do not operate through a price mechanism.  
As he makes clear in his Nobel lecture, this is a problem 
that goes to the root of economics, which since Adam 
Smith has argued that decentralized actors, coordinated 
by prices, can make socially beneficial decisions.  More-
over, Smith argued, efficiency (and hence competitive-
ness) lay in specialization -- so why aren't most relations 
governed by price?  Why do firms exist?  Or, since we 
observe firms, why isn't economic life conducted by one 
big firm, i.e., why don't we have a planned economy?  
Why do we observe substantial, but incomplete decen-
tralization of social decision making?  Coase argued, as 
most of readers of this newsletter know, that contract-
ing, operating in a market, was itself expensive.  Finding 
willing buyers, haggling, and so forth imposes 
"transaction costs."  Of course, management imposes its 
own costs.  Therefore, argued Coase, societies use 
"private" hierarchical relations, paradigmatically mas-
ter/servant (now renamed, in agency law, em-
ployer/employee) where transaction costs of contracting 
are thought to be higher than the analogous costs of 
managing.  Sometimes we buy, sometimes we build. 
“The Problem of Social Cost " also turned on the con-
cept of transaction costs.  Coase began a rather broad 
inquiry into the nature of welfare economics by focusing 
on the ancient doctrine of nuisance, or what would later 
be called the negative externalities of an 
activity.  Coase pointed out that labeling an 
activity "a nuisance" was to give neighbors 
a right to be free of the nuisance, that is, 
was to create an entitlement on behalf of 
the neighbors.  But one man's nuisance is 
often another's livelihood.   In Coase's ex-
ample, we may ask whether a rancher has 
the right to let his cows roam, or does a 
farmer have the right to have fields unmo-
lested by cows?  Hurting one will help the 
other.  (The reciprocal nature of rights was 
a big point made by the Yale legal scholar 
Hohfeld almost half century earlier.) 
Coase argued that, in the absence of transaction costs, 
the farmer and the rancher would bargain to reach an 
allocatively efficient solution:  "the ultimate result 
(which maximises the value of production) is independ-
ent of the legal position if the pricing system is assumed 
to work without cost" (Coase, 1960, p. 8)  If the rancher 
had the right to let the cows roam, and farming was 
more valuable than cows, then the farmer would pay the 
rancher to fence the cattle in.  If ranching was more 
valuable, then the farmer would take the loss, or per-
haps abandon the land and do something else.  If the 
farmer had the right to keep the cows out, and ranching 
was more valuable, then the rancher would pay the 
farmer to waive his right to exclude the cows.  Con-
versely, if farming was more valuable, than there would 
be less ranching.   Thus, it was argued -- more labori-
ously, of course -- that in a costless environment, the 
original placement of entitlements did not matter, be-
cause the parties would contract to reach the economi-
cally efficient result.  The economist George Stigler 
named this proposition "the Coase Theorem," and so it 
came to be called. 
It is important to note that for Coase, the case of bar-
gaining in the absence of transaction costs was some-
thing of a thought experiment, used to clarify thought, 
and perhaps a model.  Transactions costs are always 
positive, indeed were ordinarily significant, and there-
fore it is generally necessary to create entitlements -- 
this is the role of the law.  The question for the law, 
then, is to establish the optimal set of social arrange-
ments: 
in choosing between social arrangements within the 
context of which individual decisions are made, we 
have to bear in mind that a change in the existing sys-
tem which will lead to an improvement in some deci-
sions may well lead to a worsening of others. Further-
more we have to take into account the costs involved 
in operating the various social arrangements (whether 
it be the working of a market or of a government de-
partment), as well as the costs involved in moving to a 
new system. In devising and choosing between social 
arrangements we should have regard for the total ef-
fect. (Coase, 1960, p. 44) 
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As I read him, Coase thought he was mapping the 
boundaries of markets, and in doing so, expanding the 
domain of economic thinking to society writ large, where 
markets were but one mode of ordering. 
Transaction costs were used in the one case [in The-
ory of the Firm] to show that if they are not included 
in the analysis, the firm has no purpose, while in the 
other [in "The Problem of Social Cost"] I showed, as I 
thought, that if transaction costs were not introduced 
into the analysis, for the range of problems consid-
ered, the law had no purpose. (Coase, 1993, p. 62) 
In one of the ironies of recent history, however, Coase 
became famous for the Coase Theorem itself, under-
stood as a fair description of a wide range of human rela-
tions.  If there were no barriers to contract, then social 
outcomes could be presumed to be the result of explicit 
or implicit bargains, and hence efficient.  If transaction 
costs were in fact significant, government action 
(notably regulation and judicial decision) might be taken 
to create situations for which marketplace actors would 
have bargained, thereby replicating the optimal alloca-
tion of costless markets.   Doing this sensibly required 
(deeply speculative) analysis of various alternative uses 
of the factors of production.  In light of the fact-intensive 
and open-ended nature of such inquiries, it was perhaps 
unsurprising that, at least in the United States, markets 
would be presumed to pose no substantial barrier to 
socially beneficial contracting.  And given the costs of 
bureaucratic regulation, and the risk that government 
would abuse its monopoly of legitimate force, many in 
the United States were quite inclined to agree with 
Coase that often the best response to social cost "was to 
do nothing about the problem at all," i.e., deregulate.  
Thus was law and economics born. 
It is important to emphasize that the misreading of 
Coase is a matter of degree rather than of kind; converts 
tend to zealotry.  But Coase himself believed that the 
price mechanism was the fundamental, and indeed pre-
ferred, mode of social ordering.  In his Nobel acceptance 
speech, Coase said:  
The economy could be coordinated by a system of 
prices (the "invisible hand") and, furthermore, with 
beneficial results. . . . Economists have uncovered the 
conditions necessary if Adam Smith's results are to be 
achieved and where, in the real world, such conditions 
do not appear to be found, they have proposed 
changes which are designed to bring them about.  . . . 
What I endeavoured to do in the two articles cited by 
the royal Swedish Academy of Sciences was to at-
tempt to fill these gaps or more exactly to indicate the 
direction in which we should move if they are ulti-
mately to be filled. (Coase, 1991) 
For Coase, markets were presumed, raising questions 
why other forms of social ordering were necessary, and 
insofar as they were, how to make their operations as 
socially productive as possible.  From this perspective, it 
is unsurprising that, generally, Coase was unsympathetic 
to regulation.  Sometimes it is better to do "nothing 
about the problem at all."  More specifically, in some-
what less famous work, on matters like lighthouses and 
the distribution of the radio spectrum, Coase insisted 
that markets could work quite well in lieu of government 
action. 
The stir raised by the (mis)reading of "The Problem of 
Social Cost" led to a resurgent and vastly increased inter-
est in "The Nature of the Firm."  And so, approaching his 
eighties, Coase was hailed as a sage.  Fame is a strange 
thing: authors do not get to decide if, when, or how their 
ideas will be received.  For his part, Coase spent another 
(!) generation arguing, most notably in his Nobel Prize 
acceptance speech, that (i) he was a rather simple mind 
and not a great economist, and (ii) he had been substan-
tially misunderstood.  He found almost no agreement for 
either proposition. 
Both Coase's career and our fascination with prizes il-
lustrate how deeply we remain influenced by the idea of 
genius, and how problematic it is to talk about intellec-
tual influence or even greatness as a property of an indi-
vidual mind.  Thoughts are taken up, or ignored, or 
(de)formed to fit the interests of their times.  For pur-
poses of intellectual history, the fact that Coase was 
somewhat misread is both easily overdone and irrele-
vant, as are substantial objections to Coase's ideas in 
both theory and practice.  At the end of illustrious lives it 
is appropriate to ask after historical questions, e.g., why 
did Coase's work so powerfully strike a chord when it did 
-- which brings me back to the assertion that Coase was, 
in spite of himself, a mythmaker. 
Transaction costs preserve the anthropology of eco-
nomics: individuals are still the basic unit of social life 
(regardless of what other disciplines may say), and indi-
viduals contract to get things done.  Thus the social is a 
product of individual action), which feels more scientific 
(since called methodological individualism).  When the 
social stubbornly reappears in firms and other hierarchi-
cal settings, and ordering cannot plausibly be ascribed to 
contract or price, then the social can be explained as an 
artifact of implicit bargaining over implicit costs.  More 
ambitiously still, the distribution of rights and the cor-
relative imposition of constraints are understood not as 
artifacts of power or belief or history, but as legal ap-
proximations to negotiations only imagined.  Thus both 
social organization and law (and presumably govern-
ment) are understood as if they were contractual in ori-
gin.  The market is ubiquitous, and economics remains 
the queen of the social sciences, even in the absence of 
actual transactions with real money.  Or, to put it differ-
ently, Coase rearticulates the Hobbesian social contract 
for those trained in economics. 
Transaction costs are thus deeply speculative, indeed 
subjunctive, treated as if they had happened in fact, 
when, quite simply, they have not.  It is important to re-
member that there is neither a transaction nor, there-
fore, a cost to doing the transaction.  The "cost" is an 
assigned value, not an observed price.  Coase's great 
metaphor relies on a deep comfort, widespread in a 
commercial society, with both the idea of money as a 
unit of account and the arithmetical consequences of 
accounting.   So we unselfconsciously speak of the nega-
tive value of a company; we may assert that, if one share 
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is worth $100, then the owner of ten million shares has a 
billion dollar stake; we may ascribe the difference be-
tween book value and price to "goodwill" and be done.  
The arithmetic is sound, but we are not talking about 
money in use, transactions, or the world.  Similarly, with 
transaction costs, the difficulties of doing that which is 
not done are "priced," or more commonly, it is asserted 
that their price would be higher than the course of ac-
tion taken (the formation of a firm, the granting of an 
entitlement). 
After Coase, there is a "price" for what is purchased, 
and a price for what is not purchased or even offered.  
By way of analogy, consider how the natural numbers, 
which count what is, imply negative numbers, which 
quantify what is not.  To shift metaphors slightly, trans-
action costs "balance the books" on social life, much as 
the concept of equity balances a balance sheet.  Such 
concepts flow from the structure of formal thought, and 
so are convincing, but are also deeply, profoundly, un-
empirical.  And it is another irony of intellectual history 
that throughout his life Coase insisted on the importance 
of empirical work in economics. 
After transaction costs, the domain of economics is not 
the study of actual transactions, or even of plausible 
transactions on real goods and services, but of conceiv-
able transactions, i.e., social ordering that might be de-
scribed transactionally.  Some things have prices; other 
things have transaction costs.  Thus money goes from 
being an asset class, situated in a social and institutional 
matrix, to a symbol for universal value.  That accom-
plished, everything could be articulated in terms of con-
tract, even when no contract was to be seen.  Thus 
transaction costs make economics capable of articulating 
most all of social life, adjudicating "social arrange-
ments."  
This view is both profoundly reassuring (it reassures us 
of our liberal autonomy) and powerfully conservative 
(this is the world, more or less, for which we have bar-
gained.)  To be more specific, Coase, especially as radi-
calized by Stigler, appeals to several elites.  For academic 
economists, transaction costs vastly extend the reach of 
their discipline, and more delightfully still, make eco-
nomics logically prior to law (and by extension, culture 
itself), which fit nicely with the traditional aspiration to 
speak with the a priori imperiousness of a natural sci-
ence.  Coase was aware of this: "it is my view that the 
approach used in that article ["The Problem of Social 
Cost"] will ultimately transform the structure of micro-
economics -- and I will explain why."  This expansive no-
tion of transactional costs had serious downsides.  It ap-
peared empirical, but licensed raw speculation.  It turned 
on a frivolous notion of money, but then again, money 
has always been something of an embarrassment to mi-
croeconomics. 
For capitalists, transaction costs provided both an apol-
ogy for the status quo and, more importantly, a political 
economy for which regulation was always a second-best 
solution.  The financial deregulation of recent years 
would not have been imaginable without great faith in 
the ability of sophisticated, and not so sophisticated, 
actors to reach socially beneficial agreements regarding 
things like default risk. 
The appeal of the Coase theorem, and to lesser extent 
the "Theory of the Firm," to legal scholars is somewhat 
puzzling.  While many law professors resisted the im-
pulse to explain the world in terms of implicit contracts 
and around alleged costs (the even more speculative 
reliance on alternative uses of factors of production has 
been, to my knowledge, ignored), more subscribed.  This 
is odd.  One might have thought that lawyers would vis-
cerally sense the importance of history, of power, of in-
stitutional arrangements -- of lots of things besides con-
tract, implicit or not, to understanding social privilege.  
And surely lawyers should emphasize the difficult and 
uncertain and hence very partial nature of contracts, 
which they are taught in their first year of law school?  It 
is something of a mystery, but I think Coase's texts sug-
gested a very appealing vision of social order, in which 
property entitlements, civil institutions, marketplace 
action, and law itself make sense in terms of one an-
other, and where the comfortable individual retains his 
sense of self-worth.  Under the spell of such a vision, law 
could allay its ancient anxiety of being groundless, ille-
gitimate, faithless.  This is not the place to develop such 
speculations about the spiritual history of my profession.  
For now, it is worth commemorating a marvelous mind if 
an accidental poet, and also remembering that there are 
reasons Plato cautions against poetry. 
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